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RICHMOND, VA:

REV. J. WILLIAM JONES, D. D.,

SECRETARY SOUTHERN HISTORICAL SOCIETY.

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Vol. IX.

Richmond, Va., April, 1881.

No. 4.

History of Lane's North Carolina Brigade.

By General J. H. LANE.

BATTLE OF SPOTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE—REPORT OF GENERAL LANE.

HEAD-QUARTERS LANE'S BRIGADE, September 16th, 1864.

Major,—I have the honor to report that after leaving the Wilderness battle-field on the afternoon of the 8th of May, my brigade marched continuously and rapidly until 2 o'clock on the morning of the 9th. At 6 o'clock A. M. we resumed our march, reached Spotsylvania court-house about 12 M., and at once entrenched on the left of the road leading to Fredericksburg—our right resting on the road. Next day we moved to the left and connected with Johnson's brigade, and subsequently occupied Johnson's position, our right resting at the salient beyond the brick-kiln. That night we moved very rapidly to the support of a part of Ewell's command, but not being needed, we were ordered back to our previous position. On the 11th we were ordered still further to the left. I did not like this position, and seeing that I could get a more commanding one, and at the same time shorten the line and

thereby connect with Steuart's brigade of Johnson's division, I threw four of my regiments forward, abandoning the old line of works with the exception of the part occupied by the Thirty-seventh regiment on the right. The Twenty-eighth formed close upon Steuart in the "Double Sap" which had been thrown up by Johnson's pioneer corps, with its right resting upon a boggy piece of ground. The Eighteenth entrenched itself on an elevated point on the opposite side of this boggy place, with its right resting on a swampy branch. The Seventh and Thirty-third regiments intrenched on the same line between the swampy branch and the left of the Thirty-seventh, the right of the Seventh resting on the Thirty-seventh, and the left of the Thirty-third on the branch. This new line of intrenchments, thrown up and occupied by the Seventh, Thirty-third and Eighteenth regiments, formed an exterior obtuse angle with the line occupied by the Thirty-seventh, and was nearly at right angles to an abandoned arm of the old works, which ran to the rear from the apex of this obtuse angle. I informed Major-General Wilcox of what I had done, and it met with his approval. With Steuart close upon our left and Walker, of Heth's division, on our right, we occupied this position until the following morning.

About daybreak on the morning of the 12th, I was on the left of my line when the enemy penetrated Johnson's front. I ordered the Twenty-eighth regiment to hold its position until I was satisfied that the Yankees had struck Steuart and were making for our rear. I then ordered Colonel Spear to move his regiment by the right flank to the abandoned arm of the old works above referred to, but before I could withdraw this regiment, with the Eighteenth, Thirty-third and Seventh, to the point indicated, the enemy, under cover of the dense fog which prevailed at that time, struck us in the flank and rear, and succeeded in capturing some prisoners from the left of the Twenty-eighth and Eighteenth regiments. The Seventh and Thirty-third withdrew in order and formed as directed on the left of the Thirty-seventh, while the Eighteenth and Twenty-eighth, though thrown into some confusion, came up like brave men and formed on their left. Thus thrown back behind this arm of the old works, we could enfilade the new, which we had just left. In the best of spirits the brigade welcomed the furious assault, which soon followed, with prolonged cheers and death dealing volleys—the unerring rifles of the Thirty-seventh and part of the Seventh thinning the ranks of the enemy in front, while the rest did good execution in rear. It is impossible for me to speak in too high terms of my command in repulsing this terrible attack of the enemy—men could not fight better, nor officers behave more gallantly—the latter

regardless of danger, would frequently pass along the line and cheer the former in their glorious work. We justly claim for this brigade *alone* the honor of not only successfully stemming, but rolling back this "tide of Federal victory which came surging furiously to our right."

As soon as I had changed the front of my brigade, I sent my aid, Lieutenant Oscar Lane, to Major-General Wilcox for reinforcements, as I was afraid the enemy, under cover of the fog, would attempt to turn my left. When Scales's brigade came up just after the enemy had made their last desperate effort to force us from our position, I directed them to form on my left, and while this movement was being executed by that brigade, Doles's brigade of Ewell's corps, moved in line of battle from the woods, and occupied the new works from which my men had driven the enemy. At General Doles's suggestion, I formed my brigade on the right of his, and both moved forward over the intrenchments and abattis into the pine thicket in front, in pursuit of the enemy. I apprised General Wilcox of this movement, and when we had advanced between three hundred and four hundred yards into the thicket, I was ordered by him, through Lieutenant Lindsey, to fall back to the works. Having informed Doles's brigade of this order, and having also sent back to notify the troops in our rear of what we were about to do, I ordered a withdrawal of the brigade by wings. I withdrew the right wing first, and in perfect order; the left then retired under Captain Hale, and in good order, but not until they had poured a few volleys into a body of Yankees immediately in their front. As the works were occupied by other troops on our return, the brigade was formed to the rear, in the woods, and allowed to rest.

After the rain we were ordered to occupy that part of the line between the salient and the brick-kiln, which had previously been held by McGowan. Soon after taking this position, our corps of sharpshooters, under Captain W. T. Nicholson, of the Thirty-seventh regiment, was sent out, in obedience to orders, to reconnoitre the ground in advance of the salient, and were soon actively engaged.

The Seventh and Thirty-third regiments were afterwards sent under Lieutenant-Colonel Cowan, into the oak woods to the right of the salient, to ascertain if the enemy had a line of battle in that direction. They were subsequently instructed to attack the enemy as soon as his position was discovered. Lieutenant-Colonel Cowan ordered four companies—two from the Seventh and two from the Thirty-third—under Captain Thomas G. Williamson, of the Seventh, to precede him as skirmishers. Captain Williamson engaged the enemy's skirmishers, drove them back upon their line of battle and reported the result to

Lieutenant-Colonel Cowan, who was making his arrangements for an attack when I joined him with the balance of the brigade.

I had been ordered to the oak woods near the ice-house by Generals Early and Wilcox, with instructions to face to the front; after the left of my line had gotten well into the woods to advance upon the enemy and try to capture the battery which was planted in the open field beyond the salient, and which had been enfilading that part of our works which we had just left. The main object of this movement, however, as I was informed, was to relieve Ewell's front, which at that time was heavily pressed by the enemy. On reaching Lieutenant-Colonel Cowan, I faced my whole brigade as directed, the regiments being in the following order from right to left: Seventh, Thirty-third, Thirty-seventh, Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth. In this position I threw forward skirmishers before advancing, Captain Williamson, with his four companies, being still on the right flank. Mahone's brigade, under Colonel Weisiger, had formed about one hundred yards in our rear as a support. Just here I received orders from General Early, through one of General Wilcox's couriers (Baily), to advance at once and rapidly. To guard against a flank attack I ordered the Seventh regiment back at right angles to our general line and then had it moved forward, under Captain J. G. Harris, in the direction of Williamson's skirmishers. When I ordered the general advance I notified Colonel Weisiger of the fact through my Adjutant-General, Captain Hale, and requested him to follow us in supporting distance. My men, as usual, moved forward very handsomely and, encouraged by their officers, drove the enemy's sharpshooters out of the oak woods, rushed upon their battery of six guns—four Napoleons and two rifles—which was in the open field, and struck Burnside's assaulting column in flank and rear. Our men commenced yelling too soon and drew upon themselves a terrible fire of canister from four of the guns above referred to. The enemy's artillerists fought with great gallantry, some being shot down while serving their pieces after a part of the battery had fallen into our hands. We also suffered from the fire of two other batteries—one on the right and rear, on the Fredericksburg road, and the other to our right and front. We were in great danger, too, from the fire of our own guns of Walker's artillery when we were fighting the assaulting column. The infantry fire in our rear was for a short time more severe than that in front, as Mahone's brigade poured such a fire into us that Lieutenant-Colonel Cowan and Lieutenant-Colonel McGill had to rush back and ask them not to fire into friends. What induced these brave Virginians to fire upon us I have never been able to learn.

After my brigade captured the battery of six guns, which we were unable to bring off for the want of horses, and because there was no road by which we could bring it off by hand, we turned our whole attention to Burnside's column, which was taken by surprise as it advanced to the assault of the salient. Some part of my brigade became mixed up with the enemy, and for a time there was fighting at close quarters. As soon as we had passed the battery, I sent Captain Hale to request Colonel Weisiger to form his brigade on the right of mine, that we might sweep around to the left and up to our works, and add to the captures already made by my brigade. This message was delivered to Colonel Weisiger when his brigade was in the oak woods between the little stream of water and the crest of the hill that sheltered them from the enemy's fire. My brigade continued to fight the enemy until the head of the two parallel lines of the enemy, which were coming from Ewell's front, were in skirmishing distance of us, and as I could see no indications of an intention on the part of Colonel Weisiger to comply with my request, I ordered my command to fall back, which was necessarily done in some confusion, as the lines had been broken in capturing prisoners, and the woods through which they withdrew rendered it almost impossible to preserve anything like a line of battle.

While all four of the regiments of my command that moved upon the battery and Burnside's column behaved nobly, the Thirty-seventh had the best opportunity of displaying its bravery, as it was immediately in front of the four pieces that were turned upon us, and suffered heavily from canister. I have never seen a regiment advance more beautifully than it did in the face of such a murderous fire. The Seventh regiment also behaved very gallantly on our right flank. It there engaged the enemy, and prevented them from getting in our rear, and did not fall back until the rest of the brigade commenced retiring.

The corps of sharp shooters, under Captain W. T. Nicholson, did good service that day, and are deserving much praise.

Among the brave spirits that fell during this hard but glorious day's work were my Aid, Lieutenant Oscar Lane; Captain N. Clark, Company E, Twenty-eighth regiment; Captain H. C. Grady, Company D, Thirty-seventh regiment; Lieutenant E. A. Carter, Company A, Thirty-Seventh regiment; Lieutenant C. T. Haigh, Company B, Thirty-seventh regiment; Lieutenant B. A. Johnston, Company C, Thirty-seventh regiment. Than these none were more attentive to

duty—none more upright in their conduct—none more gallant on the battle field.

Colonel John D. Barry, of the Eighteenth regiment, and Colonel W. H. A. Speer, of the Twenty-eighth, behaved with great coolness in withdrawing their commands while attacked in the morning, and in the flank movement that afternoon seemed determined to offset the loss sustained by their regiments earlier in the day. Colonel W. M. Barbour, of the Thirty-seventh, behaved with his usual gallantry in both engagements, but was unfortunately captured in the latter, after the order had been given for the brigade to fall back. Lieutenant-Colonel R. V. Cowan, commanding the Thirty-third regiment, was conspicuous for his gallantry both in the morning and afternoon; but he particularly distinguished himself in the morning, when, hat in hand, he was constantly running along his line and cheering his men, though himself all the time exposed to a storm of Yankee bullets. Captain J. G. Harris, who has frequently commanded the Seventh regiment, and has been commanding in this campaign ever since the Wilderness fight, has proved himself worthy of a higher position. I was also struck with the bravery displayed by Captain J. R. McAnlay, Company I, Seventh regiment, in the morning fight. A brave, Christian officer, he was always to be found at his post ready for any duty that was assigned him, however dangerous and arduous. Lieutenant C. T. Haigh, Company B, Thirty-seventh regiment, was amongst the foremost in the charge upon the battery, and won the admiration of all who saw him.

Again do I beg leave to call attention to my staff. My Aid, Lieutenant Oscar Lane, after behaving very gallantly in the morning, was struck in the afternoon by a shell, and has since died of his wounds. Captain E. J. Hale, Jr., the Assistant Adjutant-General, also behaved well in the forenoon, but had better opportunities of displaying his gallantry in the flank movement in the afternoon, when, by his boldness, he not only escaped capture, but took several prisoners, and sent them safely back to the rear.

I am indebted for my own life to private P. A. Parker, Company D, Thirty-seventh regiment, who killed the Yankee that had leveled his gun and was in the act of firing upon me—the Yankee was not more than ten paces from us at the time. Private Parker is a brave young man, and has shown himself an excellent soldier in camp and on the march, as well as in battle.

In the flank movement my brigade captured three flags and a large number of prisoners—supposed to be about four hundred—notwith-

standing, General Mahone said, in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel McGill, that afternoon, that "the d—d North Carolinians were deserting his brave Virginians."

First Lieutenant James Grimsley, Company K, Thirty-seventh regiment, with a small squad of men, had the honor of capturing the colors of the Seventeenth Michigan, and about thirty prisoners. Lieutenant Grimsley is a very brave man.

Second Lieutenant O. A. Wiggins, Company E, Thirty-seventh regiment, was captured by the enemy, but by his boldness succeeded in making his escape, and brought off with him the flag of the Fifty-first Pennsylvania regiment and several prisoners.

Private J. H. Wheeler, a brave soldier of Company E, Eighteenth regiment, is entitled to the credit of capturing the battery flag.

Some of the prisoners captured by my brigade were sent to the rear under small guards and others without any guard at all, and there taken charge of by Mahone's brigade and conducted to the Court-house.

As General Mahone claims for his brigade one of the flags and most of the prisoners captured by mine, I deem it my duty, in justice to my own command, to make the following statement: In our advance through the oak woods we encountered nothing but the enemy's skirmishers, except the force on our right flank, which was held in check by the Seventh North Carolina regiment of my brigade until we had fallen back. The battery which we captured and were unable to bring off was in the open field at least one hundred yards from the oak woods, and Burnside's assaulting column, which we fought, advanced upon the salient through an open space and a pine thicket, and as General Mahone's brigade of "brave Virginians" never left the oak woods in which it formed line of battle, it was impossible for it to capture any large number of the enemy, except the unarmed ones sent by us to the rear. I had far better opportunities of witnessing the performance of Mahone's brigade than did General Mahone himself. I was in the oak woods, I was in the open field, and I was also in the pine thicket beyond the opening, and I know that Mahone's brigade did not leave the oak woods, and that it lost a golden opportunity for covering itself with *merited* glory by not forming on my right and sweeping around, as I had requested it to do. When we fell back Captain Hale met with Colonel Weisiger and, *at his request*, conducted him and his brigade out of the oak woods. I never saw General Mahone after he introduced me to Colonel Weisiger and I had taken my command into the woods, but I am told by some of my officers that he

was riding around on horseback in the edge of the woods, near the Fredericksburg road, abusing my brigade generally, and claiming for his own most, if not all, of the prisoners that were brought to the rear, when really his brigade was leaving the woods guided by my Adjutant General, unconscious at the time that they were all to be made such heroes of by their General for having unnecessarily taken charge of the captives of another command.

The following is a Tabulated List of the Casualties on the 12th, with the Names of the Officers Killed, Wounded and Missing.

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
General Staff	1						1		1
Seventh N. C. Regiment.....	11	3	28		4	3	43		46
Eighteenth N. C. Regiment	1	1	14	8	133	9	148		167
Twenty-eighth N. C. Regiment...	1	7	1	17	3	97	5	121	126
Thirty-third N. C. Regiment.....	4	2	17		22	2	43		45
Thirty-seventh N. C. Regiment...	4	18	3	30	2	38	9	86	95
Grand Total.....	6	41	10	106	13	204	29	441	470

Officers Killed.

General Staff—Lieutenant Oscar Lane, A. D. C.—mortally wounded.
 Twenty-eighth Regiment—Captain N. Clark, Company E.

Thirty-seventh Regiment—Captain H. C. Grady, Company D; Lieutenant E. A. Carter, Company A; Lieutenant C. T. Haigh, Company B; Lieutenant B. A. Johnston, Company C.

Officers Wounded.

Seventh regiment—Adjutant Jno. W. Pearson; Lieutenant J. L. Stafford, Company H; Lieutenant T. P. Molloy, Company D.

Eighteenth regiment—Lieutenant A. McCollenny, Company H.

Twenty-eighth regiment—Lieutenant R. D. Orman, Company B.

Thirty-third regiment—Lieutenant W. F. McEntyre, Company D; Lieutenant I. N. Anderson, Company I.

Thirty-seventh regiment—Acting Ensign R. M. Staley; Captain D. L. Hudson, Company G; E. H. Russell, Company I—on the 10th May.

Officers Missing.

Eighteenth regiment—Captain F. M. Wooten, Company H; Captain T. C. Lewis, Company I; Lieutenant D. S. Bullard, Company A; Lieutenant Neil Townsend, Company D; Lieutenant A. A. Rowland, Company D; Lieutenant G. W. Corbett, Company E; Lieutenant Frank McIntosh, Company F; Lieutenant I. Q. Elkins, Company H.

Twenty-eighth regiment—Captain S. S. Bohannon, Company I; Lieutenant H. C. Andrews, Company G; Lieutenant P. H. Turner, Company K.

Thirty-seventh regiment—Colonel Wm. M. Barbour; Lieutenant I. D. Brown, Company C.

After we had fallen back and reformed that afternoon, we occupied the works to the left of the road near the court-house. From that time until the 21st, we frequently changed our position to the left of the court-house, strengthened old works, built new ones, and sometimes marched to the support of other commands, but were not actively engaged.

The following is a list of our casualties from sharp shooting and shelling from the 13th to the 20th May.

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Seventh N. C. Regiment.....									
Eighteenth N. C. Regiment.....									
Twenty-eighth N. C. Regiment.....		1		1				2	2
Thirty-third N. C. Regiment.....						4		4	4
Thirty-seventh N. C. Regiment.....			1				1		1
Grand Total.....		1	1	1		4	1	6	7

Officers Wounded.

Thirty-seventh regiment—Captain William T. Nicholson, Company E, on 18th instant.

Action near Spotsylvania Court-house, May 21.—On the after-

noon of the 21st we moved to the right, following Scales's brigade, to a church some distance to the right of the Court-house. Here we turned to the left, marched beyond the works, and formed the Thirty-third, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-seventh regiments in line of battle in the woods to the left of a small road; the Seventh and Eighteenth, under Colonel Barry, being formed in rear as a support. In obedience to orders, we then advanced through an almost impenetrable abattis, dislodged and drove back a strong line of the enemy's skirmishers, and held their main line of breastworks until after dark, when we were ordered back to the church.

In this charge Lieutenant E. S. Edwards, Company G, Twenty-eighth North Carolina, was killed. Lieutenant Edwards was regarded by Colonel Speer as one of his best officers.

That night we commenced our march in the direction of Ashland.

List of Casualties in the Charge on the 21st May:

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers	Men.	Officers	Men.	Officers	Men.	Officers	Men.	
Seventh North Carolina Troops.....		1		7				8	8
Eighteenth " ".....				1		3		4	4
Twenty-eighth " ".....	1			2			1	2	3
Thirty-third " ".....									
Thirty-seventh " ".....			1	2			1	2	3
Grand Total.....	1	1	1	12	...	3	2	16	18

Officers Killed.

Twenty-eighth regiment—Lieutenant E. S. Edwards, Company G.

Officers Wounded.

Thirty-seventh regiment—Lieutenant O. A. Wiggins, Company E.

Respectfully,

JAMES H. LANE, *Brigadier General.*

Major Joseph A. Engelhard, A. A. G. of Wilcox's Light Division, A. P. Hill's Corps.

General Lee Acknowledges the Receipt of the Captured Flags.

HEAD-QUARTERS A. N. VA., ON BATTLE-FIELD,
May 13, 1864.

Major-General C. M. Wilcox, Commanding Division:

General,—General Lee directs me to acknowledge the receipt of the flags captured by Lane's brigade in its gallant charge of yesterday, and to say that they will be forwarded to the Honorable Secretary of War, with the accompanying note, and the names of the brave captors.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. S. VENABLE, A. D. C.

What General Early says about Lane's Brigade at Spotsylvania Courthouse, on the 12th May.—In his "Memoir of the Last Year of the War for Independence," &c., General Early says: "Before daybreak on the morning of the 12th, Wilcox's brigades were returned to him, and at dawn Mahone's division was moved to the right, leaving Wright's brigade of that division to cover the crossing of the Po, on Field's left. On this morning the enemy made a very heavy attack on Ewell's front, and broke the line where it was occupied by Johnson's division. A portion of the attacking force swept along Johnson's line to Wilcox's left, and was checked by a prompt movement on the part of Brigadier-General Lane, who was on that flank. As soon as the firing was heard, General Wilcox sent Thomas's and Scales's brigades to Lane's assistance, and they arrived just as Lane's brigade had repulsed this body of the enemy, and they pursued it for a short distance." * * * *

"Subsequently, on the same day, under orders from General Lee, Lane's brigade of Wilcox's division, and Mahone's own brigade (under Colonel Weisiger) were thrown to the front, for the purpose of moving to the left and attacking the flank of the enemy that had broken Ewell's line, to relieve the pressure on him, and, if possible, recover the part of the line which had been lost. Lane's brigade commenced the movement, and had not proceeded far, when it encountered and attacked, in a piece of woods in front of my line, the Ninth corps, under Burnside, moving up to attack a salient on my front. Lane captured over three hundred prisoners and three battle flags, and this attack on the enemy's flank, taking him by surprise, no doubt, contributed materially to his repulse. Mahone's brigade did not become

seriously engaged. The attacking column which Lane encountered, got up to within a very short distance of a salient defended by Walker's brigade of Heth's division, under Colonel Mayo, before it was discovered, as there was a pine thicket in front, under cover of which the advance was made. A heavy fire of musketry from Walker's brigade and Thomas's which was on its left, and a fire of artillery from a considerable number of guns on Heth's lines, were opened with tremendous effect upon the attacking column, and it was driven back with heavy loss, leaving its dead in front of our works. This affair took place under the eye of General Lee himself." * * * *

General Lee Compliments the Sharp-Shooters of Lane's Brigade.—It is due the corps of sharp-shooters of my brigade to state that after the flank movement on the 12th of May, General Lee sent for me and told me that he had witnessed the gallantry of these brave men, as well as the cheerfulness with which they had endured the hardships of the day, and that he had such a high appreciation of their services as to make him unwilling to order them forward again, but as they had been thoroughly tried and he wished to make another very important reconnaissance on the Fredericksburg road he would be glad if they would make it for him. I at once told him that however tired they might be I knew they would go wherever he wished them. To which he replied, "I will not send them unless they are willing to go." I went for Captain W. T. Nicholson, at that time commanding them, and introduced him to General Lee, who repeated what he had just said to me. In a few minutes afterwards our sharp-shooters passed General Lee with cheers, and again pushed vigorously to the front.

Sherman's Advance on Meridian—Report of General W. H. Jackson.

HEAD-QUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
BENTON, MISS., March 21, 1864.

Major,—In compliance with orders from the Major-General commanding I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command, consisting of three brigades, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Wirt Adams, L. S. Ross, and Colonel P. B. Starke, during the late advance of Sherman's army from Big Black to Meridian and its return to Vicksburg.

The enemy commenced crossing Big Black on the afternoon of the 3d February; were met by Colonel Wood's regiment, Adams's brigade,

near Champion Hill on the morning of the 4th. At the same time Starke's brigade was resisting one corps of the enemy on the Messenger's Ferry road. The entire force of the enemy was about thirty thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry. Heavy skirmishing was kept up until the enemy reached Jackson, on the 5th. Ross's Texas brigade had been left on the Yazoo river to defend that country. The behavior of officers and men of Adams's and Starke's brigades in resisting the advance was excellent. On arriving at Jackson my command moved out ten miles on the Canton road, and remained there until the enemy commenced crossing Pearl river, moving in the direction of Brandon. On the 7th February I moved with Starke's brigade to the rear of the enemy, near Brandon; Adams's brigade accompanied Major-General Lee on the flank of the enemy. There was but little opportunity to accomplish anything in the rear, except to skirmish heavily with rear guard, pick up stragglers, &c. The enemy moved in good order, well closed up, with wagon train of each brigade in rear of their respective brigades. At Decatur Woods's and Dumontail's regiments, Adams's brigade, made a dash on a wagon train and succeeded in killing a number of men and mules, but were compelled to abandon wagons captured, as enemy had force of infantry in front and rear of train. The command fought the enemy at Meridian, where the brigade of General Ross joined my command from the Yazoo country, which it had well protected, having fought three times their number and repulsed enemy on land, the men using their six-shooters, on foot, at the distance of twenty-five paces; at the same time the section of King's Missouri battery, commanded by Lieutenant Moore, drove back the gunboats.

All praise is due the fighting Texans and King's battery, and their gallant leader, General Ross, for their noble defence of the Yazoo country. At Meridian Adams's brigade was assigned temporarily to Ferguson's division.

On the 16th I moved with two brigades towards Columbus, Miss., to reinforce General Forrest, and arrived at Starkesville on the 23d. The raiding party from the north, under General Smith, retired the day before, upon hearing of the approach of Major-General Lee's command. On the 24th, in compliance with orders, I moved my division in pursuit of Sherman's army, on way to Canton. I detached Ross's brigade at Kosciusko to proceed to and protect the Mississippi Central railroad and Yazoo country.

February 27th we reached Sharon, Miss., and Starke's brigade encountered the enemy and fought them in gallant style, capturing a

number of horses, mules and wagons. The enemy were scattered in parties of thirty and forty, foraging and pillaging through the country. I therefore adopted the plan of detaching regiments to operate against them. This succeeded admirably, Colonel Peirson with his regiment (First Mississippi) being very successful—captured a number of the enemy, killed and wounded many, and brought off nine wagons and teams. The officers and men of Croft and King's batteries deserve great praise for their promptness in the execution of orders and gallant behavior in presence of the enemy.

The enemy remained about Canton three days, my command skirmishing with them daily, killing and capturing many, striking principally at their foraging parties, my object being to confine the enemy, as far as possible, to their lines, and prevent, in a great measure, their destruction of the country. In this I was successful. On the 28th, having previously assumed command of Ferguson's division, consisting of his own brigade, commanded by Colonel Earle, and Adams's brigade, I made the following disposition of the command, viz:

Adams's brigade on left flank of enemy, Starke's on right and Ferguson's in rear. In this manner they pursued the enemy to within a short distance of Big Black, capturing fifteen wagons and teams and one hundred and fifty prisoners, killed and wounded numbers, also captured fifty cavalry horses and equipments, notwithstanding the enemy was aware of our presence, and moved in fine order, without straggling. The effect was to confine them closely to the road on which they were moving.

I beg leave to call the attention of Major-General Lee to the part performed by Lieutenant Harvey and his gallant band of forty scouts; he was everywhere doing good service, killed and captured of the enemy four times his own number. His daring coolness and judgment eminently fit him for promotion and much larger command. I commend him to the notice of the Major-General commanding.

The loss in my division during the campaign was two hundred and twenty-five killed, wounded and missing; that of the enemy, about four hundred prisoners, with as many killed, with a large number of mules, horses, wagons, arms and equipments captured.

I am informed by my staff officers, just returned from Vicksburg on a flag of truce, that Federal officers admit a loss of three thousand missing. The number of their killed will never be known, as a great many were killed while out from the main body, plundering and burning houses.

Troops never behaved more gallantly or soldierly than those of my

command during the entire campaign, and I think that everything that could possibly have been done was executed by the command of Major-General Lee.

My thanks are due General Ferguson for his gallantry, energy and prompt compliance with all orders, while temporarily under my command. To my brigade commanders, General Adams, General Ross and Colonel Starke my thanks are especially due for efficiency and zealous discharge of every duty and their noble bearing on the field. Too much praise cannot be bestowed upon the heroic spirits who follow them.

I respectfully refer to the detailed reports of the brigade commanders for the losses, captures, &c.

I would call the attention of the Major-General commanding especially to that portion of General Ross's report referring to the capture of Yazoo city, which I consider a perfect success.

My thanks are also due the members of my staff, Captain George Moorman, A. A. G., Captain Thomas B. Sykes, A. I. G., Major W. R. Paul, Q. M., Major A. P. Glover, C. S., Major I. F. Simmons, Paymaster, for gallantry and efficiency on the field.

My aid de camp, Lieutenant James R. Crump, was killed while gallantly leading my escort company in a successful charge against a party of marauding Yankees near Sharon, Mississippi, February 26th, 1864. He was a brave and noble officer.

Very respectfully,

W. H. JACKSON,

Brigadier-General Commanding.

To Major Wm. Elliott, A. A. and I. General.

REPORT OF GENERAL RICHARDSON.

HEAD-QUARTERS WEST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,
BENTON, MISS., March 7th, 1864.

Major,—On the 23rd of February, I received an order from Major-General S. D. Lee, commanding cavalry west of Alabama, to move my brigade to Grenada "for the protection of the public property at that point, and to guard against raids from Yazoo City."

I started from Tampica on the morning of the 24th, and hearing that evening that the enemy was raiding unrestricted over the country between the Yazoo river and the M. C. R. R., from Greenwood to Lexington, I moved rapidly to surprise and chastise him.

I reached Elliott Station on the evening of the 25th, and preparing three days rations, leaving my train except my ambulances, taking only my effective men and horses, then numbering six hundred, and the rifle section of Thrall's battery, I started at noon on the 26th February to Carrollton, hoping that by moving all night, I would be able to pass between a party of negroes led by white officers, then raiding about Black Hawk, and their gunboats and transports at Sidon, and cutting them off from their boats, would be able to capture and destroy them. I marched all night, and next morning learned that these negroes had returned to their boats. I moved on to Sidon on the east bank of the Yazoo river, and finding that the enemy had gone down the river on his boats, I sent scouts to Tchula to find the locality, if in that neighborhood. My scouts reported that eleven transports and three gunboats had proceeded down the river to Vicksburg and that one transport and two gunboats were reported west of Honey Island loading with cotton. My information derived from citizens and our soldiers captured, and who had escaped, showed pretty conclusively that this armada was composed of twelve transports and five gunboats, the Eleventh Illinois infantry, one regiment of negro cavalry, and one regiment of negro infantry, variously estimated at from one to two thousand men. It also appeared that their object was to take cotton, stock, and negroes and corn, and to hold and navigate the Yazoo river for the purpose of drawing from its rich granaries subsistence for the army at Vicksburg. Feeling that the supplies of the Yazoo valley were of great value to the country, I deemed it of vast importance to punish the enemy and drive him, if possible, from this river, that we might preserve its rich abundance of army supplies for the use of the Confederate forces, with which I believed it was designed to hold and occupy this region of country. Accordingly, so soon as I received the information that three boats were west of Honey Island, I moved to Tchula, thence towards the foot of Honey Island; but before I reached this point, my scouts returned from a thorough reconnoissance of Honey Island, reporting that all the boats had descended the river to Vicksburg.

Believing now that the enemy had returned to Vicksburg, I moved from Yazoo Bottom to rear Lexington, determined to return to Grenada by slow marches, resting my men and horses.

I received now several dispatches from Brigadier-General L. S. Ross, from the vicinity of Benton, indicating the presence of the enemy at Yazoo City. I moved in that direction, and on the evening of the 4th of March formed a junction with him at the Ponds, six miles east

of that city. My effective force was now reduced to five hundred and fifty men, and that of General Ross was about one thousand men. I found General Ross well informed as to the position of the enemy, his works of defence, and the topography of Yazoo City and environs. He made full (as I afterwards saw to be), true, and accurate explanation, giving me the benefit of his valuable information upon these points. He reported to me as the ranking officer, but on account of his superior information as to the defences and approaches of and to Yazoo City, I declined to assume the command, making him my equal in rank, both agreeing to consult and coöperate. At 8 o'clock, A. M., on the 5th of March, we moved from our camp at the Ponds, determined to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and feel of him in force, and, if the opportunity should appear favorable, to capture the city and works.

At 10 o'clock, A. M., we commenced the attack. Colonel Mabry was ordered to attack on the Plank road; Colonel Jones to carry the left central redoubt; Colonel Hawkins to carry the extreme right redoubt. These officers belonged to General Ross's brigade, and their dispositions were made by him.

Acting under General Ross's advice, I placed Captain Thrall's section of artillery on a point about one thousand yards from the right central redoubt, and opened upon it. Captain Thrall soon obtained the range, and his shells seemed to burst right over the works. General Ross now moved on the Plank road to the left, commanding the left wing. Colonel Hawkins, commanding the First Texas Legion, very soon drove the enemy from the extreme right redoubt, and this gave me a much better position for Thrall's section, also opened one of the main roads into the city, exposed the camp of the Eleventh Illinois regiment and the north side of the main redoubt, which it now appeared the enemy intended to hold if possible. General Ross had now captured his two redoubts on the left of the *main* or *right central*, and had placed his section of artillery (Lieutenant Johnson commanding) in a good position at easy range, and was playing it upon the *main central* with good effect. This work was the largest and strongest of all the works; had in it one piece of artillery; was flaunting the United States flag, and now became the special object of our attention. We had now four pieces throwing shells at this work. One of my pieces, however, soon disabled itself by its recoil. I received a message from General Ross, saying that he had thrown the forces of his wing, to-wit: Colonel Mabry's, Colonel Jones's, and the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, Colonel Neeley commanding, around the east and

south sides of the fort, and the shells which went over the works fell among our own men. I now saw that I could complete the investment of the work, and storm and take the city. I ordered Major Ross, commanding Sixth Texas, to move up a wooded ravine and attack the north side. I ordered Colonel Hawkins, commanding First Texas Legion, to move on the jagged slope of the bluffs, clear it of the enemy, swing on his left, and extend the arc of a circle, formed by Major Ross, to the north and west. I ordered Colonel Thomas Logwood, commanding the Fifteenth Tennessee cavalry, to move through the upper edge of the city, and Major John Thurmond, commanding Fourteenth Tennessee cavalry (Colonel Neeley's right), to move centrally through the city. These officers, and their commands, promptly and gallantly executed these orders, and in twenty minutes we had completed the circle around the main redoubt, and swept the heights above the city, except the main redoubt, and had taken the city by storm, except the tier of buildings fronting the river, under the immediate cover of their two gunboats, in which a number of the enemy had posted themselves, and were firing from the windows of the houses. In driving the enemy from one of these houses, the gallant and accomplished gentleman and soldier, Major J. G. Thurmond, fell dead, shot through the head, leading his regiment, the gallant Fourteenth Tennessee cavalry. He is dead. His deeds place him in the ranks of that honored few whom we delight to recognize as the *bravest* of the *brave*.

Two gunboats now opened their batteries upon us in the city and rained down showers of balls from exploding shrapnells. Captain Thrall now placed in position, on one of the streets, in fifty yards of a brick house occupied by the enemy, his piece, and opened upon it with terrible effect. I held the city for three hours, destroying quartermaster's stores and cotton, not without, however, a continuous struggle with the enemy's sharp-shooters, posted in houses and his gunboats, until the latter were silenced. Colonel Logwood having driven the enemy from the upper part of the city, by gallant and impetuous charges, had wheeled his regiment upon its left and closed the circle of investment, and commanded the sally post of the main central redoubt. About four o'clock in the evening General Ross reported to me, in the city, the progress made against the central redoubt, and the refusal of the enemy to surrender the main redoubt. We concluded that to carry the work by storm would sacrifice too many valuable lives, and was not worth the price. Two boats of re-inforcements were approaching the city; our ammunition was nearly exhausted; we had felt the

enemy heavily; had damaged him very much; it was nearly night; we determined to withdraw.

We captured mules, horses, clothing and ammunition, and seventeen prisoners. The loss of my brigade was thirty-seven killed and wounded; of the two brigades sixty-four. The enemy's loss from all I can gather, must have been over one hundred, though he stated it to citizens at two hundred and forty-three.

The enemy has been compelled to evacuate the city, and it is hoped that he will abandon the idea, heretofore entertained, of opening the Yazoo river, and drawing cotton, negroes, stock and supplies from its rich valley.

The Fourteenth Tennessee cavalry was under my immediate observation, and it gives me great pleasure to commend the gallantry of both men and officers. The Fifteenth Tennessee cavalry and its gallant and dashing Colonel Logwood behaved well—not a man or officer straggling from it to the rear. Its flag bore and now bears ten bullet holes through its folds and one through its staff, as honorable mementoes of the fierce struggle it passed.

I cannot close this report without mentioning, in terms of commendation, the promptness to carry my orders and the gallant bearing throughout the entire day, of Captain W. E. Reneau, Acting-Inspecting General on my staff, and Lieutenant V. B. Waddell, picket officer of my brigade. My Aid De Camp Lieutenant J. T. Joyner and Volunteer Aid J. M. Lucas bore my orders promptly. It gives me great pleasure to commend the gallantry of Brigadier-General L. S. Ross and his entire brigade of Texans. I desire also to commend Captain Thrall and his men and officers for their bravery and good firing on this occasion. The Captain was wounded in the city after it was captured, standing by his piece, by a sharp-shooter of the enemy. Lieutenant C. Adams, my ordnance officer, was also wounded in the city.

I have the honor to be,

R. V. RICHARDSON, *Brigadier-General.*

To Major Holt, A. A. General.

REPORT OF COLONEL P. B. STARKE.

HEAD-QUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, I. C. D.,
Near Livingstone, Miss., March 13th, 1864.

Captain,—I have the honor to report that at 5 o'clock, A. M., on the 4th ulto., whilst near Brownsville, Miss., I received an order from

General Jackson, directing me to move my brigade to Reynolds Ponds, on the road leading from Queens Hill to Clinton, and to be there by daylight. As soon as the order reached me I moved my command, and took position at the Ponds a little after sun-rise. A short time afterwards I was notified by the pickets at Queens Hill, that the enemy were approaching in force. I threw forward the First Mississippi regiment, and one piece of artillery, under command of Colonel Pinson, of First Mississippi regiment, to Colonel Jos. E. Davis's place, one mile in advance of my position, to force the enemy to develop his strength as far as practicable. A short time after they had taken position the pickets were driven in, and about 10 o'clock they became hotly engaged with him, and after a spirited resistance against his infantry, artillery and cavalry, deployed in line of battle, they were forced to fall back in rear of position taken in the morning, which was held by the Twenty-eighth Mississippi regiment, under Major McBee, Ballentine's regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, and Crafts Battery, until the enemy came against them in line of battle, ten to one in number, across an open field, and their skirmishers forced the withdrawal of the battery, and of the Twenty-eighth, which was dismounted, and were being flanked on both sides. I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, with his regiment mounted, to hold the position until those troops were withdrawn, and had taken position in the rear, in the meantime they were exposed to a heavy fire from the artillery and infantry, and a rapid advance of the enemy's whole line. Night coming on I withdrew the command to the Ponds near the Wells's place, and bivouaced for the night, the enemy having halted at Reynolds Ponds. He commenced his advance at daylight the next morning, and attacked my pickets; I ordered forward Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell, with his regiment to re-inforce them, who became hotly engaged upon arriving on the ground, and were forced back to the position I was occupying at Wells's with the other two regiments and battery. The enemy in heavy force advanced rapidly in line of battle, on this position, and a brisk engagement took place. At this time General Jackson came on the field from the Bolton depot and Clinton road, running parallel with the one I was on, where General Adams with his brigade had been resisting the approach of the other army corps of the enemy, and directed in person the firing of my artillery. The enemy here had pushed on their column on the Bolton and Clinton road, until they became opposite my position, (the roads here converging closely together,) and opened a cross fire upon me from that road. While they were playing on my position with their artillery from the front they were

still advancing, with the same force I had been contending with the day before, with their centre, and deploying their wings forward on the right and left of my position. At this moment I was ordered by General Jackson to withdraw my command two miles east of Clinton, on the Jackson road, and take position there, ordering at the same time my artillery to Clinton.

By the time I had taken this position, the columns of the enemy's force had united at Clinton, where they became engaged with General Adams's brigades. I was then ordered by General Jackson to move my command nearer to Clinton, which was done and held the position, until General Adams's command retired and took position at the tombstone, about one-and-a-half miles in my rear, when I was ordered by General Jackson to withdraw my command, and take position near the breast-works west of Jackson. Apprehending that the enemy might make a flank movement on the road leading from Clinton *via* Mississippi Springs to Jackson, I sent some scouts to ascertain if such was the case; they not reporting, I sent out a company from the Twenty-eighth, under Captain Ratcliff, who reported immediately, that they were advancing on that road in force, with infantry, cavalry and artillery, and were then nearer Jackson (the point we were falling back to) than the position held by our troops. I immediately sent a staff officer to inform General Jackson of the fact, and that I would withdraw my brigade and try to get to Jackson before the enemy and intercept him there, he meeting up with General Lee delivered the message to him; I withdrew the brigade by regiments (my battery not having been ordered back to me at this time) in their regular order to Jackson, when I received an order from General Lee to move my column out on the road leading from Jackson to Canton. Here the roads and streets were much obstructed by large numbers of stragglers and hangers on of the army in their flight. I moved my column to reach the bridge, where the roads leading from Clinton intersects the Canton and Jackson road, supposing the enemy might move in that direction from Clinton, (as they had troops enough to make any move they chose,) and intercept the passage of our trains across the bridge. On reaching Hanging Moss creek, four miles north of Jackson, I came up with General Lee's Quarter-master in charge of all the trains, halted my command, took position, and at this time was joined by General Lee, who informed me that General Ferguson was guarding with his brigade the road leading from Clinton to the bridge, when I bivouaced at this point for the night, and remained for three days until it was discovered that the enemy were crossing Pearl river, at Jackson, in the direction of Meridian.

After crossing Pearl river I was under the immediate command of General Jackson, and was marching in the rear or flank of the enemy for several days, and became again engaged with him near Meridian on the 14th ult. The First Mississippi was placed in line on the road leading from Meridian to Demopolis, and a mounted squadron from the Twenty-eighth Mississippi regiment on right of road near hospital, and skirmished briskly with them at that point, when they fell back to a position in the rear of the Twenty-eighth Mississippi regiment, which was formed in line dismounted. This regiment then engaged them and fell back in rear of Ballentine's regiment, which was formed in line mounted; the enemy in the mean time keeping up a brisk fire from his artillery and infantry.

I then withdrew my brigade and formed it in line on the west side of the railroad, their right resting on it, which position I held until the enemy had advanced in force, when I withdrew my command on the road leading from Meridian to Demopolis and skirmished with him there; when compelled to fall back, did so on the road leading from Meridian towards Lauderdale Springs, and bivouaced for the night at ——. My artillery was not present this day, having been ordered back towards Enterprise by General Jackson, they not being able to keep up with the column, which was moving rapidly towards Meridian, in order to reach that point before the enemy. I remained in the vicinity of Meridian for three days, and then proceeded to Lauderdale Springs *via* Almucha, moving from that point to Starksville *via* Macon to meet the column advancing down the Mobile and Ohio railroad, from Tennessee, under command of Generals Smith and Grierson. Upon arrival at Starksville it was found that they had been driven back by General Forrest.

I was then ordered by General Jackson to move my brigade to the vicinity of Sharon and Canton, *via* Kosciusko, which I did, arriving at Sharon on the 27th ultimo. I saw no more of the enemy until my arrival there, and as their column was marching on the road leading from Ratcliff's Ferry to Canton, which passes within a short distance of this place, my advance guard soon became engaged with him. I sent forward Ballentine's regiment, who commenced skirmishing with him, but a superior force coming up, soon compelled it to fall back, which it did in good order, and I left a squadron of the First Mississippi regiment in the edge of the town to cover its retreat and fell back to a good position about one mile to the rear, where I had placed my artillery (a section of King's battery), and there formed a line of battle. This position I held until dark, when I fell back five miles for water

and forage. At an early hour next morning I again marched to Sharon, and with Ballentine's regiment and the artillery I took the direct road to Canton, sending Colonel Pinson, with the First Mississippi, off on my right, and Major McBee, with the Twenty-eighth Mississippi regiment on my left, with instructions that when I met and engaged the enemy, they should close in on the flanks. About two miles from Sharon I met the enemy and skirmished with him for some hours, but hearing nothing from the other two regiments, and night coming on, I fell back to Sharon, when I learned that Major McBee had met with a column of the enemy that occupied his whole attention and prevented him from joining me. Colonel Pinson likewise met a large foraging party and engaged them, and after a spirited contest, succeeded in routing them and driving them from their wagons, of which he captured nine with their teams (60 mules) killing and wounding some, and taking fifteen prisoners. I again fell back to my old camp, and on the following morning attacked the enemy at the same place as on the previous day, sending Major McBee on my right to attack his flank if an opportunity offered. This, however, was impossible from the nature of the ground, and the position of the enemy, who now brought up a large force of infantry and artillery, and I was again compelled to fall back before a greatly superior force. The next day being extremely cold and rainy, I could do nothing more than send out scouting parties to watch the movements of the enemy.

On the following day, being the 2d of March, I ascertained that the enemy were leaving Canton, and I pursued them as rapidly as my jaded horses would permit of my doing. General Ferguson being in their immediate rear I took the upper Vernon road from Canton and kept on their flank without coming in contact with them until I came within four miles of Brownsville. Here I determined to attack their train, and disposed my forces accordingly. This was at a point where the road that I was traveling and the one taken by the enemy came within a mile of each other. I sent Major McBee with the Twenty-eighth Mississippi regiment to charge the train as soon as he saw a favorable opportunity, and afterwards ordered Colonel Pinson, with the First Mississippi regiment, to form in his rear and be ready to support him or cover his retreat, as the necessity of the case might determine, at the same time sending Colonel Ballentine with his regiment towards Brownsville, on the road that I had been marching on, to strike them on the flank. Before, however, Major McBee concluded to attack the train the enemy's rear guard, consisting of seven regiments of infantry and three regiments of cavalry, came up and formed a line of battle

and commenced skirmishing with him, and this force being greatly superior to my whole command, and night coming on, I fell back a few miles for water and forage, and early the next day the rear guard of the enemy's column crossed Big Black and I then fell back to this place in obedience to orders.

My whole loss during the different engagements from February 4th to March 4th was as follows: Killed, wounded and missing, 49.

I captured and killed 128 Federal officers and men.

Enclosed you will find Lieutenant Harvey's (commanding my scouts) report of operations during the raid.

There were many instances of personal gallantry in the different skirmishes, but the behavior of both officers and men was marked by such courage and determination in holding every position assigned them, against overwhelming numbers, that I will make no discrimination in this report.

Lieutenant Harvey's report shows that he brought to bear his usual undaunted courage and extraordinary energy and judgment.

I am, Captain, very respectfully,

P. B. STARKE,

Colonel Commanding Brigade.

To George Mormon, Captain and A. A. General.

Battery Gregg—Reply to General N. H. Harris.

By General C. M. WILCOX.

In a contribution to the *Southern Historical Society*, published in the last number of those papers, the writer, General N. H. Harris, regrets what he regards, seemingly, as a necessity, inspired by his love of truth and justice, to appear before the public as a party to the controversy touching the defence of Battery Gregg, April 2nd, 1865. With a natural dislike to controversy, there was, to use his own words, "an additional dislike when such controversy is with any of my former comrades in arms, * * * and, only for the sake of truth and justice, am I willing to disturb the kindly relations that should exist between old comrades."

Is it to be apprehended that friendly relations among former comrades in arms will be disturbed by what may be written about incidents of our late war, when it cannot be questioned that it was in-

spired alone by the love of truth and justice? When disputes arise as to the details of battles fought—and it appears to be inevitable that they should arise—it is to old comrades in arms, who were present and took part in those about which there are differences of opinion, that we must look for information; these are competent to settle satisfactorily all disputed points, and as they cannot come together for that purpose, they are forced to appear in print, to have recourse to the newspapers and periodicals.

I prepared and sent to the Southern Historical Society for publication, a brief outline of such military operations, as I had knowledge of, that occurred in the vicinity of Petersburg during several days preceding the evacuation of that town and Richmond. The defence of Battery Gregg was included in that brief narrative, inaccurate accounts of which I had read in history,* biography,† and newspapers.‡ And as I wrote to correct, in part, the misstatements of others, it was my purpose to be as accurate as the information I had, as to what I was relating, would permit. I had near me at the time my own report of the incidents referred to, and if I was mistaken in any details given, it would give me much pleasure to have them pointed out, to the end that they be corrected, for I would regret exceedingly to find in history, errors that could be justly charged to any delinquency on my part. I must reiterate all that contribution—found in the July (1877) number of these papers—contained, with reference to Battery Gregg. If, however, there be any mistake in what was then written, it may be as to the numbers of those that defended it. I have always believed there were about two hundred; it is possible I may have underestimated, though they were placed there by my order and in my presence. That number of men was, I thought at the time, as many as could conveniently fire over the crest of the work.

General Harris referred by name to those who had written of the attack and defence of Gregg, as well as to the time of, and periodicals in which publications were made, and adds, "I shall now state a few facts from memoranda made in writing in the latter part of the year 1865"; and then gives information as to where his brigade was the night of April 1st, and how and under what orders he reported to me the next morning near the Newman house, on the plank road. Then says, "As I approached I saw that the enemy had broken his (Wilcox) lines in heavy force, and was extending in line of battle across the open fields in direction of the Southside railroad." This quotation

* Swinton's *Army of the Potomac*.

† Cooke's *Life of General Lee*.

‡ *Vicksburg Times*.

may make the impression, whether so designed or not, that the heavy body of the enemy seen by him on his arrival was the same that had broken our lines; if he so believed, he was mistaken.

The lines had been carried by another force about daylight, the Sixth corps, commanded by General Wright, the present Chief Engineer of the army, and near the point crossed by the heavy force seen by him. Our lines once crossed, the most of the hostile forces turned to their left, and swept up the lines to Hatcher's Run, and along that to Burgess' Mill; a less body wheeled to their right and cleared our lines to the vicinity of Battery Gregg. On reaching Gregg, about sun up of April 2nd, I found both it and Battery Whitworth occupied by portions of Lane's and Thomas's brigades and a few artillerymen.

These fragments of brigades were reunited near Gregg, and ordered forward to recover our lost lines. They obeyed promptly, and with spirit, and the lines were regained to within the immediate vicinity of the Boisseau house, near which the force seen by General Harris, marching by flank, crossed them.

General Harris made an extract from my contribution to the Southern Historical Society, and admits that it was substantially correct. It had, in his opinion, only two mistakes: (1.) I had over-estimated the strength of his brigade, taking it to be about five hundred, when in fact it had but four hundred, one hundred having been left behind on the skirmish line near Swift Run. (2.) And I had called a certain house "Barnes's" house, when it should have been "Newman's" house. The extract made by him contained no such name as "Barnes's," but "Banks's" house was used, and correctly. It was four or five hundred yards beyond Battery Gregg, to the left of the plank road going from Petersburg. When Colonel Venable informed me that Harris's brigade would soon report, I replied that I knew it well, that it numbered about five hundred men. The condition of my front was such when it arrived that it was immaterial whether it had that or more than that number. As the question at issue was as to the composition of the little garrison that held Gregg, it would have been well for General Harris to have quoted from my article on that point. I stated that it was composed of detachments from Thomas's, Lane's, and Harris's brigades, and two pieces of artillery, and that there were fewer men from Thomas's than from either of the other two brigades.

With reference to the disposition of his brigade he says he "placed two regiments—the Twelfth and the Sixteenth—by my (Wilcox's) orders in Battery Gregg." He may be correct, but I am inclined to believe that it was a certain number of men I ordered to be detailed

from his brigade for that purpose; this would have been more definite as to numbers. He also says "I rode in front of Battery Gregg and instructed Colonel Duncan to have plenty of ammunition brought into that work;" he was but transmitting my orders, the ammunition had been ordered up before he reached the field; also, "I assumed immediate command of Whitworth, as the larger part of my command occupied it;" this would imply that it was an act of volition on his part, instead of an order from a military superior; he was ordered into Whitworth for the reason he gave, and there being also more artillery in it. Again, he states "he was ordered by General Lee a few minutes after the fall of Gregg to retire from Whitworth," at least he so understood it. He retired from that work by my orders. General Lee would not have sent him such an order without its passing through me, as I was in charge of that part of the field. The order reached General Harris a few minutes after the fall of Gregg, but it was dispatched to him before it was taken, when it was apparent that it must be captured. Having evacuated Whitworth, he "retired to the inner lines running from battery Forty-five to the Appomattox." Our lines did not extend to that river, there was an interval of near one mile between the right and the river; and it was this gap that the troops from the north side of the James river filled up when they arrived.

General Harris refers to what General Lane stated in his communication on the defence of Gregg, and if he quoted him correctly, he (Lane) was wrong, for General Harris did not retire from Whitworth before Gregg was attacked in force, and then by my orders, and after the fall of Gregg; and in battery Gregg was a number of Harris's brigade, that exceeded his (Lane's), if I remember correctly.

Besides his own statement, General Harris gives one signed by a number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates of the Twelfth and Sixteenth Mississippi, and by several others not of those regiments. All these say, "We assert that said defence was made by the Twelfth and Sixteenth Mississippi regiments, Harris's brigade and a section of Washington artillery. There may have been a *few* men of other commands, but they were without organization." I do not question the honesty and good faith of this statement; they were simply mistaken. The men of the two brigades (Lane's and Thomas's) that were in Gregg by my orders, had been in service as long as those of Harris's, and were not inferior to them in discipline. They had been engaged early in the morning, had lost heavily in killed, wounded and prisoners, but with ranks sadly thinned, they responded promptly to my orders, and recovered a portion of our lost lines, again to be given

up, and this time, by my orders, to retire to Gregg and vicinity. General Harris gives a letter from Captain A. K. Jones, who commanded the Twelfth Mississippi in Gregg; in this are several inaccuracies. The writer says: "General Wilcox is wrongfully informed when he says the enemy first got into the works from the rear," &c., &c. I was not informed by others, but saw for myself, and wrote from my own personal observation. I was an eye-witness to the entire struggle, was standing about one hundred and twenty-five yards from Gregg, saw its heroic defense, sent encouraging messages into it three times—the last messenger never returned. The enemy reached the parapet in force at the right end of the palisading across the gorge; here began an unfinished trench, some thirty yards long. It was the purpose to have connected Gregg with Whitworth, but it was never done. On the embankment of this they mounted easily, and from this to the parapet of Gregg, and soon extended nearly around it in force, and poured down a fire upon what was left of the little force inside. It was when I saw this, and that the defence was virtually over, that I dispatched an order to evacuate Whitworth. It is not often we meet with one who can claim exemption from one of the three following fruitful sources of error, misunderstanding, misconception, and lapse of time weakening impressions made upon the memory. Again, this officer says: "The fort (meaning Battery Gregg) was carried about 1 P. M. We had ample time and opportunity to see the result of our defence, for when the guns in Whitworth were opened on Gregg, after it was captured," &c., &c. No one can question the honesty of this statement, and yet it is known, and by no one better than by General Harris, that the guns in Whitworth had been withdrawn early in the action, and that Gregg had fallen before he withdrew from that battery. Gregg was captured before 11 A. M.

There is a letter from Captain R. R. Applewhite also of the Twelfth Mississippi; both he and Captain Jones speak of other men besides those of their brigade being in the battery, but they both say they were without organization; the former says, to be exact, "There may have been good and true men from other commands who aided in the defence." General Mahone was requested, though not present, to write of the defence of the battery. Not being there, he could only repeat what he had heard. Lieutenant-Colonel Owens, Washington artillery, "can't see what General Lane had to do with Gregg," as he had always understood that the fort was held by Mississippians. General Gibbon, of the Union army, was invited to express an opinion as to the composition of the command. He regretted he "could give no information

in regard to the garrison of the fort." It will be seen that General Harris was industrious in beating up evidence—writing to those who were not present, as well as to those of the other side. He could not accept my statement of the case, though present and having control of the whole affair.

I have omitted, unintentionally, up to this point, reference to Brigadier-General R. L. Walker's letter. He was Chief of Artillery of Hill's corps. He writes: "On the morning of the 3d of April, 1865, I was at Rice's salient until about sun up, when it was reported to me that the lines in front of Fort Gregg had been broken." He was not at Rice's salient on April 3d, 1865. He repaired at once to Battery Gregg, a distance, I should think, the way he would have to go, of at least three or four miles. The lines, he says, had been broken, and "directly in front of Gregg they had been held by Lane's brigade." This was not the case; they had been held at and near this battery by Thomas's brigade. He manned the fort with a section of the Washington artillery and two companies organized from the supernumerary artillerymen. "I called on them to go with me to recover the line evacuated by our infantry, or at least so much thereof as had been occupied by two of my batteries, which had been left in the hands of the enemy." Evacuating lines, and leaving guns in the hands of the enemy, convey impressions not complimentary to the infantry that had held them, and these impressions are strengthened when we are informed that "they (supernumerary artillerymen) made a gallant charge, recapturing these batteries, left by the infantry, and bringing them out." Having recovered his batteries left in the hands of the enemy, he then drove back the enemy's skirmish line, &c., &c. "I then fell back to Fort Gregg, and just at this juncture the gallant Mississippians, under the intrepid Harris, came up to my relief." And did General Harris, with his brigade, relieve him and his two companies of supernumerary artillerymen? Up to this time General Walker's memory was clear and distinct, but then, for an instant, it seems to have been a little clouded. "As well as I can remember, a part of Harris's brigade, with my men, then occupied Fort Gregg, while the main body of the brigade went to Fort Alexander,* a few hundred yards to the north and right of Fort Gregg." And now his memory is again clear. "We held our respective positions until I was informed that General Longstreet had come to our relief on the right, when I dispatched my Inspector-General Captain Richard Walke to General Harris informing

* Called by others, more generally, Battery Whitworth.

him of the fact, and suggesting the propriety of falling back to the interior lines, as we had done all we could do. At the same time I sent another officer, whose name I will not mention, to Fort Gregg, with orders to evacuate it." This letter is certainly the most remarkable of any that has appeared in print thus far, connected with battery Gregg, and none can appear in the future that will exceed it in the freedom of its assertions. I believe General Harris ranked General Walker. I know he (Walker) was junior to both Generals Lane and Thomas, to say nothing of myself, and we three were all the time present—myself after about sun up, and within less than one hundred and fifty yards of Gregg, until it fell. And yet this junior officer, according to his own account, exercised supreme command, disposing of the troops to meet the enemy's advance, and ordering them to withdraw when he was informed that our right was reinforced. When I ordered the withdrawal of the troops, I had not been informed of the arrival of reinforcements to fill the gap on our right. I knew the resistance made by our small numbers had been intended to delay the advance of the enemy until they should arrive. I can't say that General Walker was not present near battery Gregg the morning of April 2nd. I certainly have no recollection of seeing him, but I did hear subsequently that he had sent an order to battery Whitworth, which I will refer to before closing this too lengthy account of this small, though brilliant affair.

General Harris makes quotations from four letters written by officers of Lane's brigade, and addressed to their former commander, two of these officers were of the Thirty-third and two of the Thirty-seventh North Carolina regiment. These officers were in Gregg during the fight. The General disposed of their statements very briefly, indulged freely in humor, wit and ridicule—a method practiced by himself, possibly, as a lawyer when seeking to weaken testimony, facts and logic being against him. One of the officers, Lieutenant Snow, Thirty-third North Carolina regiment, says, "After ammunition was exhausted they used rocks," and "for over half an hour." "This *rock* story shows what *weight* this testimony is entitled to, &c., &c.," says the General; the italics are his. He may not be aware of the fact, but this was not the first or only time that *rocks* were used in battle during the war. If he will read the official report of the battle of Second Bull Run, he will see that General A. P. Hill mentions the fact that one of his brigades having exhausted ammunition, used *rocks*. If I remember correctly, there had been either huts or tents in Gregg, and they had chimneys made of brick or stone, or of both of these kinds of material. This officer may have overestimated the time *rocks* were used—not one

man in a thousand—no man can estimate time with exactness whilst under close musket fire. Lieutenant Craige, of same regiment, he seeks to discredit by using severer terms. "The immense and imposing numbers of the enemy had, by comparison with the small number of the garrison, so dwarfed his visual organs, &c., &c." The style of criticism adopted by the General was a matter of taste to be determined alone by his own sense of propriety.

We learn from these letters, written by officers of the Twelfth and Sixteenth Mississippi, and the Thirty-third and Thirty-seventh North Carolina, that there were both Missippians and North Carolinians in battery Gregg, and from those of the latter that there were also some Georgians in it. These officers differ as to the numbers of their respective brigades. At the time it could never have occurred to them that the number of the other would ever be called in question, and they required to give it.

A few more quotations will be made, and from General Harris himself. Among those he cites as having expressed opinions about the Battery Gregg fight, was Captain W. Gordon McCabe, who, in an address delivered before the "Association of the Army of Northern Virginia," and published in the December, 1876, number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, in a note, page 301, says, according to General Harris, "that the defense of Battery Gregg April 2d, 1865, had been wrongfully attributed to Harris's Mississippi brigade, and that the defense was made by Lane's brigade." Upon an examination of the number of those papers referred to, I find the note at the bottom of the page does not contain such words, but the following: "The error of attributing this brilliant defense to Harris's brigade alone, doubtless arose from Lieutenant-Colonel Duncan, of that brigade, being the ranking officer in the fort." He did not say the defence was made by Lane's brigade, or that it had been wrongfully attributed to Harris's brigade. But he gave a reason why it had been attributed to Harris's brigade alone, and all must see that it was a good one. Had the ranking officer of that small garrison been of Thomas's brigade, it would have been very naturally believed that the men defending it were Georgians, and had an officer of Lane's brigade ranked it would have been equally inferred that the little garrison was of that brigade.

General Harris, page 480, says: "It is somewhat remarkable that during the long period of fifteen years, when public *prints*, both foreign and American, as well as many eye-witnesses of the day, have accorded the defence of Battery Gregg to the Mississippians and the gallant Louisiana artillerists, that others who at this late date now come forward and

claim *all* the honors of that occasion, *should have remained utterly silent.*" General Harris refers to General Lane's official report, found in the January number, 1877, of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, and on examining that I find it—the report—is dated April 10, 1865, eight days, and not fifteen years, after the battle. The same number has a letter addressed to myself by General Lane on this subject, dated May 20, 1867, a few days over two years subsequent, and the letters of the four officers of Lane's brigade, before referred to, are dated in June, 1867.

And again, General Harris says, on same page: "Sufficient for me to say that what has appeared heretofore has not been *printed* by any one connected with the brigade, or at their instance; and singularly there has been a great unanimity on the part of foe, friend and stranger in giving the credit of that defence to Harris's brigade." If we examine the February number of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, referred to by General Harris as containing "A Soldier's Story of the War," by Napier Bartlett, giving an account of the defence of Battery Gregg, we will find, pages 84-5, as follows: "The part taken in defence of Gregg by the Mississippians is thus described in the *Vicksburg Times*: "Fort Gregg was held by the Twelfth and Sixteenth Mississippi regiment, Harris's brigade, numbering about one hundred and fifty muskets, &c., &c," no reference being made to any other infantry as forming a part of the garrison. Napier Bartlett, says General Harris in a letter designed to be an official report, says, "General Wilcox ordered me to take position in front of the enemy, and detain them as long as possible," and then goes into details such as have already been given; but with this very important addition, "preparations were now made by the enemy for the assault; at this time Captain Walke, Adjutant and Inspector General, of General Walker, chief of artillery, came with orders to withdraw the artillery, and against this I most earnestly protested." It was not a time, nor was there any occasion for a protest; General Harris should have declined to receive orders of any kind or from any source, unless they came through me, or were given by the corps commander, or by General Lee in person. He had been ordered to report to me by the commanding General, and I had assigned him to the command of Whitworth, and in it were, besides his brigade, four pieces of artillery. His permitting the artillery to be withdrawn, lessened my ability to carry out the instructions of the commanding General, and his not reporting to me that it had been withdrawn was an aggravation of the offense—its withdrawal without authority. I learned how it had been taken off several days subsequently in conversation with General Harris. "The four guns were withdrawn from Whit-

worth under protest; but the enemy were too close to permit the withdrawal of the guns from Gregg." It was owing to my proximity to that battery, no staff officer could have entered it without my seeing him. It seems not a little strange that General Harris could have supposed such orders could be properly given without my knowledge, and without passing through me. He further says, "it was a glorious struggle; Louisiana represented by the noble artillerists, and Mississippi by her shattered bands, stood side by side together, holding the last regularly fortified line around Petersburg." No reference to any other command but his own brigade and the artillery, and "holding the last regularly fortified line around Petersburg." The line he held was an unfinished line, and was not the last, for he fell back from it to the main Petersburg lines, near a mile in the rear. I have previously expressed an opinion of General Walker's letter; it is certainly the most remarkable of any to be found in all the Battery Gregg literature. One more quotation will be made from it. "The message to General Harris was delivered and he accepted the suggestion." This was for him to retire from Whitworth, but the order never reached Gregg, hence the sacrifice of its gallant defenders. General Walker certainly claims to have been in command. In his letter he does not refer to his most important order, the one to General Harris to withdraw the artillery.

General Walker was not at Battery Gregg about sun up, when I took personal control and direction of the movements of the troops engaged. As soon as the different bodies—very small—of troops could be brought together they were ordered forward, as has already been stated, to recover the lines, and about one mile was regained. I did not see General Walker in this advance. If he was as conspicuous as his letter would make us believe, in the recovery of the artillery, I ought to have seen him. I do not say that he was not present; he may have been; but I do say, what all soldiers know to be true, that I being on the field, he could not have given the orders he claims to have given—his memory, like that of many others, is defective. And his ordering the four guns to be withdrawn from Whitworth, without either my knowledge or consent, was not only an unofficer like, but an unauthorized and thoughtless act, that no one could have believed possible in an officer of intelligence, who had near four years of active field service, and had been present and a participant in many great battles, and who was at the time chief of artillery of a corps of the army of Northern Virginia.

When the guns were withdrawn from Whitworth the huge forces of

the enemy were in the immediate front of our weak lines and in the act of advancing. The guns in these two batteries had the widest possible field of fire, they being in *barbette*; the mutual support and protection designed by the engineers for these two works to give the one to the other was thwarted at the critical moment by this chief of artillery. It was a well conceived and timely act of General Harris, setting fire to the log-cabin winter quarters of a brigade that covered the front of Whitworth; he thus held the enemy at bay, and during that time the four guns—had they remained—could have delivered a rapid fire of schrapnel and grape upon the flank of the enemy, scarcely four hundred yards distant. It is probable, had this been done, the enemy would have been repulsed, and although Gregg would have been finally captured, yet during the time of preparation for a renewal of the assault the little garrison might have been withdrawn. I was not without hopes, before the engagement had been joined that such would be the result. Knowing General Harris well and esteeming him very highly, I can say he would make no statement he did not believe to be true, and of the errors cited by myself, the most of them are trivial in kind and unimportant, and that they have evidently resulted from writing in haste is shown by the fact that they have been proven to be errors by referring to the very authorities cited by himself. In conclusion, the infantry in Battery Gregg was made up of detachments from Harris's Mississippi brigade, Lane's North Carolina brigade and Thomas's Georgia brigade. There were more men from Harris's than from Lane's, and less from Thomas's than from Lane's. There were in it two pieces of artillery; I never heard until long subsequently from what State they came, and it was my impression there were a few artillerymen armed as infantry. The entire force at the time was believed by me to be about two hundred; it is very probable they were underestimated. Statements made by those in the battery at the time induce me to believe there must have been more than I supposed. Of the little force that defended it so bravely sixty-seven were killed.

C. M. WILCOX.

Washington, February 23, 1881.

The Concentration Before Shiloh—Reply to General Ruggles.

BY CAPTAIN W. M. POLK.

To the Editor of the Southern Historical Society Papers:

Sir,—In the February number of your journal is an article by General Ruggles, purporting to be a reply to one by myself, upon the march

to Shiloh. Instead of being a mere reply, however, it contains a good deal of irrelevant matter, an excuse for which it is difficult to find. One is offered though, which I will notice before going further.

It seems that the General has "reason to assume" that Colonel Wm. Preston Johnston and myself conferred very fully in relation to certain statements touching him (General Ruggles) which appear in the Colonel's Life of Albert Sidney Johnston. Permit me to say that the General is mistaken. My connection with the matter is this: Colonel Johnston wrote asking for any information I might have bearing upon the question of the delay in the concentration. In reply I sent him substantially the article over which the General exhibits such unseemly excitement, viz: that in your December number. I suppose General Ruggles had an opportunity to express himself upon the same subject. If it had but little weight I would not be surprised if the reason should be found in the General's contempt for that essential of the historian, "fact."

My article in your December number was written and published solely to correct certain impressions conveyed by one from General Jordan, in your August number. It never occurred to me that I was saying anything to wound the feelings of General Ruggles. My desire was to show that Polk was not responsible for the delay, as his movement was dependent on that of troops in his front. I had to show when and how those troops moved, but not a single word was written that could be twisted into a reflection upon them. For fear that some one might feel hurt, I even took pains to repudiate every intention of casting blame, claiming that the delay was due to the elements, and quoting General Beauregard in proof. Finally, the quotation from General Polk's official report was made in order to show that if there was an issue, it was, as *General Polk distinctly made it, between General Bragg and General Polk*. The General must, therefore, pardon me if I insist that he keep his place. His issue is with Colonel Johnston and Colonel Munford, who remove the responsibility from General Bragg's shoulders, where General Polk placed it, and put upon his General Ruggles's. I have no desire to follow their example, much preferring to leave the matter as left by the principals. Nor will I, but in order to convince the General that I have every desire to treat him justly, I will go outside my path and endeavor to answer his article.

First, as to the personalities in which the General permits himself to indulge. They are so much out of place, so beneath the occasion, and so utterly unworthy of the gentleman I knew nineteen years ago as General Ruggles, I must be allowed to pass them over. As to the General's statement that no one ever heard of his division being late

till twelve years had passed, permit me to call attention to page 110, Jordan's Life of Forrest, published in 1868. There it is stated that one division of Bragg's corps was late, and as the official reports and correspondence show that Withers was not late, and that Ruggles was, the inference is clear.

We now come to the essential point in the General's "reply." Who was responsible for the delay on the 5th of April, 1862, in the formation of the line of battle?

In my first article, as said, I was disposed to put the blame on the elements, but General Ruggles has shown me in this I erred; from his article I gather that he had a great deal to do with it. For a thorough understanding of the question at issue, some reference to the roads and order of march is first necessary. See map, page 559, Life A. S. Johnston. This involves a repetition of some things said in your December number, but it is unavoidable.

The Bark road was virtually an extension of the Ridge road. This latter, leaving Corinth by the north, gradually by an extended sweep turned east, terminating, as we have said, in the Bark road. Up to a point some two or three miles west of Mickie's Cross-roads and house, it was the Ridge road; from that point to about where the line of battle was formed, some three miles to the east of Mickie's, it was the Bark road. This Ridge or Bark road was crossed nearly at right angles by two roads leading from Monterey north, one the Monterey and Purdy road, crossing some two or three miles west of Mickie's, the other the Monterey and Savannah road, crossing at Mickie's. By the order of march, Hardee and Polk were to follow the Ridge and Bark roads, Bragg was to assemble his corps at Monterey and march one division (Withers's) direct to Mickie's by the Savannah road, while the other (Ruggles's) was to be taken to the same point by following the Purdy road to the crossing of the Bark road, thence taking the latter in rear of Hardee. It was understood that should Polk's column (Clark's division) marching in rear of Hardee, reach this crossing before Ruggles, it was to wait till Ruggles had passed to its front. Hardee was to push on to the point chosen for the line of battle and there form. Bragg was to follow closely and form promptly the second line of battle, while Polk's one division (Clark's), on the Bark road in Ruggles's rear, was to halt at Mickie's.

Such in brief was the order [see page 188, Vol. I, Official Reports Battles C. S. A.; also, page 555 Life Albert Sidney Johnston] (special order No. 8, April 3d, 1862) under which General Ruggles, in common with the troops of which we write, marched out of Corinth.

But was it carried out? Early on the 4th day, after leaving Corinth, Hardee was at Mickie's, Bragg's first division, Withers, not far off, and Polk had reached the Purdy crossing, where he was to find Ruggles filing in behind Hardee. But where was Ruggles? The answer came in a note from General Bragg, dated 10 A. M., at Monterey, saying *Ruggles would not move that way, but would follow Withers on the Savannah road, direct to Mickie's. Polk was, therefore, not to wait, but move at once to Mickie's, where he was to meet the whole of Bragg's corps.*

At the same time Bragg wrote the commanding general, "I reached here, Monterey, at half-past eight, ahead of my rear division, Ruggles's. Bad roads, insufficient transportation, *badly managed*, and the usual delays of a first move of new troops have caused the delay."

Polk then continued his march, reaching Mickie's that afternoon.

From this it is clear that almost at the outset the order of march was disarranged by General Ruggles, and this notwithstanding the fact that he had but two brigades to bring to Monterey, Gibson being already there.

Let us see how the General gets around this point, for it is, and the arrangement of his argument shows that he feels it to be, one of great moment to him.

He does it by stating that special order No. 8, April 3d, the one above referred to, "directed the concentration of the main bodies of the three corps, EXCEPTING ONLY RUGGLES'S DIVISION, at Mickie's or vicinity." And finally, that his division marched there in conformity with orders from General Bragg.

The General must pardon me—but Special Order No. 8 makes no such exception in his favor; for his sake I wish it did, as he evidently had the order before him when he wrote. It is on page 555, Life of Albert Sidney Johnston, a work from which the General freely quotes. Reference to paragraph II will show what it says about Ruggles's division. It is substantially as I state it. We have now brought our statement to the night of the 4th. The movements of the 5th are next in order.

There can be no question as to the position of Hardee's, Polk's and Withers's divisions of Bragg's corps on the morning of the 5th. The first was on the Bark road, east of Mickie's; the second on the same road, west of Mickie's, but at it; the last on the Monterey and Savannah road, with its head at Mickie's, or possibly a short distance east of Mickie's, on the Bark road, between Hardee and Polk. Again, where was Ruggles? General Bragg, in his notes to Generals Johnston and Polk, said he would be behind Withers; but General Ruggles says he

followed Hardee and Polk on the Ridge road to Mickie's, and at nightfall bivouaced at Mickie's, "not diverging materially from their order of march," that is, behind Polk, on the Bark road. (Page 58.) But the General somewhat invalidates this statement further on, for on page 61 he says, in offering a probable explanation of his delay on the 5th: "We may assume that when my division filed into the Bark road, its advance was obstructed by a division of General Polk's reserve corps—he being my senior—which had pressed forward contrary to the order of march." This assumption of the General's would seem to imply that he was not on the Bark road behind Polk, but rather, as we have always believed him to be, behind Withers, on the Monterey and Savannah road. But as this is not essential to the establishing of our position, we will allow the General to be upon either road, or upon both, if he so prefers it.

By 10 A. M., Hardee reached the enemy's out-posts and began to form line. Withers followed closely, to get his last brigade into position by 12. Ruggles was to come next, and form on Withers's left. Polk was to wait at Mickie's till Ruggles had passed, then was to follow and form in his rear. Eleven o'clock came; Hardee and Withers had disappeared in the direction of the line. The way was now clear for General Ruggles.

Where was—but we will not ask that question again. He says he was behind Polk, thus in a position that did not belong to him. The road to the west of Mickie's belonged to Polk, given him by General Ruggles's corps commander, when from Monterey at 10 A. M. the previous day he had written, that Ruggles would move behind Withers, that Polk need not wait, but was to move on to Mickie's.

This idea seems to have occurred to the General, for we find him trying to push Polk beyond Mickie's, on to ground belonging to himself (Ruggles), that is on the Bark road, east of Mickie's, directly in Withers's rear.

First he "suggests" that Clark's division followed Withers closely, then further on he "assumes" that Polk's corps pressed forward contrary to the order of march, taking his place. One would think that the General would realize that suggestions and assumptions are entirely out of place in a question of such a nature. Evidence is the thing that would be of service. I can offer some. I happened to be attached to Clark's division at the time, as junior second lieutenant in Bankhead's battery. At 5 o'clock in the morning I was at Mickie's, quite near the head of the division. There I remained till about 2 P. M., seeing every body of troops that passed between those hours. Our division (Clark's)

did not move east by Mickie's till about 2 P. M. We saw the last of Withers's about 11. Now here was an interval of three hours, and here we have the delay in the formation of the troops of which we write. Now who was responsible? Polk who was in place and under orders, waiting for Ruggles to march to his front, from the Monterey road, where General Bragg said he would be, or Ruggles who was out of place?

We see from Anderson's report [page 271, Official Reports Battles C. S. A., Vol. I] that on the night of the 4th, General Bragg in his tent developed to the division and brigade commanders the plan of battle for the coming day. "By this plan Ruggles was to form on the left of the second line of battle." General Ruggles, therefore, knew positively on the night of the 4th that he had to be in front of Polk, for Polk was a part of the reserve.

He gives us to understand that he struck Clark's rear at 7 A. M. Now much light will be thrown upon this subject if the General will tell us plainly what he was doing from that hour till 3 P. M., when Anderson gives us to understand the division took up its march for the line of battle; or, if he chooses, 12½ P. M., when Munford says he found him in Polk's rear.

Does the General mean to say that he found it impossible to pass Clark's two brigades in all that time—five-and-a-half hours by one statement, eight by the other. If he does, I refer him to Anderson's report, and to the very paragraph in it, which he quotes on page 59. This, with an extract from Mumford, he uses to prove that the troops in his front were Clark's. Anderson says, when he took his place in column, at 3 P. M., marching in the direction of Shiloh, he found the road blocked with brigades, wagons and artillery, almost up to the point where his line was to be formed; yet he passed them in an hour, getting to his point about 4.

He did it by leaving the road, and marching parallel through the woods. Will the General tell us, if this was accomplished in the afternoon, why it could not have been done in the morning. The country around Mickie's was quite as favorable to such a movement as that in the immediate rear of the line. Accepting General Ruggles's statement that he was in rear of Polk on the morning of the 5th, I have to say that, had he moved with the same celerity before 11 A. M., as he seems to have done after 3 P. M., he could have completed his line by 1, Polk his by 2, and the army might have begun the battle that afternoon.

Recapitulating, Mr. Editor, allow me to submit that the evidence establishes—

1st. That General Ruggles disarranged the order of march by not being up in time to take the Purdy road from Monterey.

2nd. He put himself behind Clark's division of Polk's corps, thus out of position.

3d. He remained behind Clark for hours, when his place was in front: thus holding Clark motionless.

4th. When he did move he got his position in an hour, showing that the obstruction in his front was not insurmountable.

5th. He completed his line after four P. M., when he could have completed it by 1 P. M.

Clark's line, as a consequence, was not formed till after 4 P. M., when it might have been formed by 2 P. M.

And now, though somewhat out of place, let me call attention to the march made by the detached division of General Polk's corps, *the only division that was excepted by Special Order No. 8 from the general order of march—Cheatham's*. It marched from its position at Purdy, to the line of battle in one day—Saturday, the 5th—the distance being but little less than that from Corinth to the line—getting into position almost as soon as General Ruggles.

One other point, Mr. Editor, and I have done.

The General would have us think that when one says he (General Ruggles) was responsible for the delay, a reproach is cast upon his troops. This cannot be admitted. The rule, I believe, is, that the commander is responsible for his troops, not the troops for the commander. A good many General officers have tried to reverse it, but I cannot recall that their efforts met with marked success.

No one for a moment supposes that General Ruggles's troops did other than obey his orders. It was my good fortune to see those troops, not only at Shiloh, with General Ruggles, but also at Mumfordsville, Perryville, Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Resaca, New Hope Church, Kenesaw, around Atlanta, at Franklin, Nashville and Spanish Fort, without General Ruggles. I never heard that they disobeyed an order or failed in a duty.

But, Mr. Editor, to end the disagreeable subject, permit me to hand you the following dispatch, penned by General Ruggles's department commander, but two days before he was killed on his line of battle:

"NEAR MARIETTA, GA., June 12th, 1864.

"Hon. Jas. A. Seddon, Secretary of War:

"Brigadier-General Ruggles, of the department of Alabama, Missis-

issippi and East Louisiana is, I believe, regarded as one of the best organizers we have in the west. He is now without employment.

"I am not aware that the War Department has made any appointment of an officer to take charge of and organize the reserves of Mississippi and East Louisiana. If no appointment has been made, I desire respectfully to present the name of Brigadier-General Ruggles for that office.

"(Signed),

L. POLK,
"Lieutenant-General."

Had General Polk lived, he intended to make this command well worthy any officer, and General Ruggles (General Ruggles had been under General Polk but a short time) at its head, with the increased rank of Major-General, as General Polk hoped to have it—tardy justice would have been rendered one whom he considered a deserving, gallant officer.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. M. POLK.

New York, 288 5th Ave., March 24th, 1881.

Reminiscences of the Army of Northern Virginia.

BY J. WM. JONES.

PAPER NO. 3.—DOWN THE VALLEY AFTER "STONEWALL'S QUARTER-MASTER."

I pass by the scenes of our winter quarters at Manassas, and of the falling back from that line of defence; for although there are many points of interest connected with these events, I can only in these papers touch on a few of the more important movements of our army.

Ewell's division held the line of the Rappahannock, while Johnston fell back to Richmond, and went thence to the Peninsula to support Magruder in the skillful and gallant resistance he had been making to the advance of the overwhelming force of the enemy. The situation at this time was anything but encouraging. The Confederates after the battle of Manassas, had been beguiled into the idea that the war was virtually over—that foreign powers would certainly recognize the Confederacy, and that it was scarcely necessary to make much preparation for another campaign.

I remember meeting, the day after the brilliant affair, near Leesburg

(Ball's Bluff), an officer of high rank, who had just returned from Richmond, and who said to me: "We shall have no more fighting. It is not our policy to advance on the enemy now; they will hardly advance on us, and before spring England and France will recognize the Confederacy, and that will end the war." The time of the enlistment of nearly the whole of the Virginia army expired in the early spring of 1862, and nearly all of the infantry were planning to "jine the cavalry," or to become artillerymen. A number of new companies of cavalry and artillery were formed (on paper), and if these plans had been carried out, the whole army would have been converted into cavalry and artillery. But the disasters at Forts Henry and Donaldson brought us to our senses, the patriotism of the men promptly responded, and most of them enlisted "for the war," while the "conscript law," which was now passed, settled the matter with any one who wavered.

The Thirteenth "Foot Cavalry" had tried in vain to be transferred to Stuart's cavalry, and they now gracefully accepted the situation, enlisted for the war, and entered upon the reorganization by the election of new officers. This fatal defect in the law by which the men were allowed to choose their own officers would have demoralized almost any other troops in the world; but the splendid *morale* of our army, their high intelligence, and their devotion to the cause, brought us safely through this severest ordeal without serious damage. There were, of course, some good officers who were thrown out, and some indifferent ones elected; but on the whole the army was about as well officered as before. In my own regiment the Colonel (J. A. Walker—A. P. Hill had been recently promoted), stated in my presence soon after the election, that if he had had the appointment of company officers, he would have appointed just the ones whom the men had elected.

Stonewall Jackson had been sent to the command of the "Valley District," in October, 1861, and had displayed that wonderful activity which seasoned his men and prepared them for what was to follow. His mid-winter march to Bath, Hancock and Romney; his indignant resignation because he thought the Secretary of War (Mr. Benjamin) had listened to complaints of his subordinates, and undertaken to regulate the internal affairs and movements of his troops without consulting him—and his brilliant fight at Kemstown, which, though in one sense a defeat, recalled to the valley the column which was marching on Gen. Johnston's flank—are all of deep historic interest, but will be omitted from these sketches, as we had not yet joined the valley army.

It was, indeed, uncertain, whether Ewell would be sent to join Jackson, or be ordered to Richmond, and even after ordered to the valley there was a doubt as to what point we would go, until finally it was decided by our falling back to Gordonsville, and marching thence to Stanardsville, in Green county, where we had for a few days a very delightful camp-ground. On the afternoon of the 30th of April, Ewell entered Swift Run Gap, which Jackson had just left, to fulfill his plan of uniting with Gen. Ed. Johnson, then posted twenty miles west of Staunton, to strike Fremont's advance under Milroy.

Ewell's division at this time, consisted of Gen. R. Taylor's Louisiana brigade, Gen. Trimble's brigade (consisting of the Twenty-first North Carolina, the Twenty-first Georgia, the Sixteenth Mississippi and the Fifteenth Alabama regiments), and Gen. Elzey's brigade (composed of the Thirteenth Virginia, the Tenth Virginia and the First Maryland regiments), and the batteries of artillery which were then attached to each brigade. We had also two regiments of cavalry making our whole force about 7,000 men well equipped, well disciplined, and of splendid *morale*. I had opportunity at this time and subsequently of seeing a good deal of Gen. Ewell, and he impressed me as being every inch a soldier. Plain in his dress, quick (and if need be rough) in his orders, prompt in execution, almost reckless in his courage, and stubborn and unyielding in holding any position assigned him, he was just the man whom Jackson needed, in whom he seemed to have the highest confidence, and to whom he was certainly indebted for much of his splendid success.

I remember being at his quarters one day at Swift Run Gap, as he was sending out a scouting party. The captain who commanded it had received his instructions and was just mounting to ride off when Gen. Ewell called him back and said: "One thing more captain, I wish you to particularly observe: I don't want you to send me any information received from 'reliable citizens.' I only want what you see or positively ascertain yourself." He seemed to appreciate fully the character of the volunteers who composed his command, and the difference between them and the old United States regulars whom he had commanded so long. He remarked to me one day: "There are a great many of these officers who will be held to account after the war is over by the rank and file of the army. Many of these men are our superiors in point of intelligence, wealth and social position, and if an officer fails to appreciate the difference between these men and the rough elements found in the old service, he will rue it when the war is over."

The brigadiers of our division were all men of mark. Gen. Richard

Taylor (son of "Old Rough and Ready") was a gentleman of rare accomplishments and a soldier of such decided ability, that he was destined to rise to the rank of lieutenant general, and give to "Stonewall's Quarter-master," (Gen. Banks) on his Red River expedition the additional sobriquet of "Dick Taylor's commissary."

Gen. Trimble rose to the rank of Major-General, lost a leg at Gettysburg and gave most untiring service to the cause he came from Maryland to expouse.

Gen. Elzey was also a Marylander who had won a fine reputation in the old army, who had been called by Beauregard at First Manassas, "the Blucher of the day," who became also a Major-General, and who was recognized as an accomplished and gallant soldier.

Besides there were then serving in the division, J. A. Walker, J. E. B. Terrill, Geo. H. Steuart, B. T. Johnson, Hays, York, J. M. Jones, Posey, Cauty and others, who afterwards won the wreath and stars.

While watching Banks, and awaiting Jackson's movements, we luxuriated in the green fields, the beautiful groves the clear streams, the magnificent scenery, and (what was, perhaps, even more appreciated), the delicious milk and elegant apple-butter of the glorious valley.

But we had not long to wait. General Banks retreated down the valley, and took a strong position at Strausburg, while Jackson raised the drooping hopes of the Confederacy by the following characteristic dispatch:

"VALLEY DISTRICT, May 9, 1862.

To General S. Cooper :

God blessed our arms with victory at McDowell yesterday.

T. J. JACKSON, *Major-General.*

After defeating Milroy—Fremont's advance guard—and pursuing him until he was driven out of the range of proposed operations in the valley, he ordered Ewell to move down the Luray valley, while he marched across by Harrisonburg down the main pike to Newmarket, and then over Massanuttin mountain to join Ewell in his advance.

I shall never forget the enthusiasm with which we started on that march. The "Luray Valley" lies between the Blue Ridge and the Massanuttin (a high and precipitous mountain which suddenly rises from the valley opposite Swift Run Gap, and as suddenly terminates near Strausburg, fifty miles below), and is one of the loveliest spots that the sun shines upon. As we moved down this beautiful valley, by the pretty little town of Luray, past many pleasant homes and well-stocked farms, the people received us everywhere with the liveliest

demonstrations of joy, and supplied us abundantly with food of every description. Ewell continued to lead the advance, which was directed on Front Royal, in order to flank Banks's position at Strausburg. The ubiquitous Ashby had pressed his cavalry close up to Strausburg, and had stretched across the main valley a *cordon* of pickets, which completely concealed our movements as we pressed on rapidly towards our objective point. I well remember when Jackson first came to the front of our column. Hearing loud cheering in the rear, which came nearer and nearer, we soon saw that it was Stonewall himself, mounted on that old sorrel which we afterwards came to know so well, and galloping along the column with uncovered head. We, too, at once took up the shout, and gave a hearty greeting to the great captain, who had come to lead us to victory, and the mountains echoed and re-echoed with the glad acclaim.

About two o'clock P. M. on Friday, May 23d, our advance (consisting of the First Maryland and Wheat's Louisiana "Tigers," all under the command of General George H. Steuart) made a dash at the Federal force stationed in Front Royal, which seemed to be taken completely by surprise, but which made a gallant resistance as it was pressed rapidly back over the two forks of the Shenandoah river.

Jackson was always in the forefront—sometimes even in advance of the skirmish line—and manifested the greatest impatience to press forward; at one time directing an aid to "order up every rifled gun and every brigade in the army."

The stubborn fight between the two "First Maryland" regiments (the Confederates under Col. Bradley T. Johnson and the Federals under Col. Kenly); the cavalry charge at Cedarville, five miles from Front Royal, in which Col. Flournoy (under the order of Jackson and in his immediate presence), charged with 250 men four times his numbers, and so completely broke and scattered them, that other Confederate forces coming up, about 700 prisoners, two rifled guns, and large quantities of arms, ammunition and stores were captured; the gallant fight of Col. Ashby, at Bucktown, and the complete turning of the position of the enemy at Strausburg, were all results of these rapid movements which I have not space to describe in detail.

We bivouaced that night just beyond the forks of the Shenandoah, while some of the pickets of our division were advanced to within four miles of Winchester.

Notes and Queries.

"DID GENERAL R. E. LEE DESCEND FROM ROBERT, THE BRUCE KING OF SCOTLAND?"—Professor William Winston Fontaine, in a paper read before the Louisville branch of the Southern Historical Society March 29th, 1881, which we hope before long to find space to publish in full, has shown very conclusively that through the Carters and Spotswoods our "King of Men" was descended from the noble King Robert Bruce of Scotland; and that "of the five heroes who particularly distinguished themselves on the glorious field of Bannockburn, in driving back the invader of their beloved country, Lee, through the same channel, was the direct descendant of four—namely: King Robert; Thomas Randolph, Earl of Moray; Walter, the High Steward; and Sir Robert de Keith, Great Marischal of Scotland." Professor Fontaine cites a number of authorities, and deserves great credit for the industry he has shown in bringing out these interesting links in the lineage of our great chief, who was in himself the peer of any Lord, or King, or noble civilian the world ever saw.

"WAS LIEUTENANT MEIGS, OF GENERAL SHERIDAN'S STAFF, KILLED IN FAIR COMBAT?"—The conclusive testimony on this point which we published in our February number was an end to all controversy, and we were not surprised to learn that Quartermaster-General Meigs (with whom we have deeply sympathized as not only losing a gallant son, but believing that he was foully murdered instead of having met a soldier's fate in fair fight) has written to a friend that he is "fully satisfied that this is a correct account of the sad affair."

If General Sheridan had investigated the matter, and enquired of General Early concerning it, instead of receiving the report of the man who ran off and left his officer and his comrade to their fate, the friends of Lieutenant Meigs would have been spared this cruel suspicion, innocent people might have been relieved of the cruel wrong of burning their houses, and the record of General Sheridan have been free from this foul stain.

"WERE THE DAHLGREN PAPERS, AS PUBLISHED IN THE RICHMOND PAPERS, AUTHENTIC, OR WERE THEY FORGERIES?"

We have been carefully collecting the testimony, and shall before long publish the most incontrovertible evidence that the papers published *were* taken from the person of Colonel Dahlgren; that they were not altered in any way, and that the charge of forgery is utterly

groundless, since there was no opportunity to forge them, even if there had been the inclination.

Meantime, as we wish to make our paper so conclusive that it cannot be answered, we beg any of our friends who may have facts bearing on the question to send them forward at once.

"JEB." STUART'S CORRESPONDENCE AT LEWINSVILLE we quoted from a version we had at the time of its occurrence, but we are very much gratified to receive from our friend, Major McClellan, the following exact copy of the original:

"LEXINGTON, KY., 12th April, 1861.

"Rev. J. Wm. Jones:

"My Dear Sir,—In your interesting 'Reminiscences,' published in the last No. of the *Southern Historical Society Papers*, you make mention of some correspondence which passed between General Stuart and some of his old army comrades about the time of the outpost affair near Lewinsville, Virginia, in 1861.

"I happen to have the original document in my possession, and send you herewith a copy.

"Yours, very sincerely,

"H. B. McCLELLAN."

"LEWINSVILLE, September 11th, 1861.

"My Dear Beauty,—I am sorry that circumstances are such that I can't have the pleasure of seeing you, although so near you. Griffin says he would like to have you dine with him at Willard's at 5 o'clock on Saturday next.

"Keep your 'Black Horse' off me if you please."

"Yours, &c.,

"(Signed),

ORLANDO M. POE,
Lt. U. S. Top'l Eng'r."

J. E. B. Stuart, Esq., Commanding cavalry near Fall's Church.

"In care of whoever finds this. Please answer both the note and Griffin's invitation."

Upon the back of this sheet is the following in Stuart's own handwriting:

"I have the honor to report that 'circumstances' were such that they could have seen me if they had stopped to look behind, and I answered both at the canon's mouth. Judging from his speed, Griffin surely left for Washington to hurry up the dinner.

"(Signed),

J. E. B. STUART."

We print the following letter in the hope that some one will be able to send the information desired by the gallant soldier who writes it:

"BOSTON, MASS.

"*Dear Sir,*—Can you inform me, or put me in the way of obtaining the information of the exact position of the extreme right of the Confederate army on the 3rd of June, 1864, with reference to the Shady Grove road and Mechanicsville road? I desire to know what brigade held that extreme right, and just where it was posted. I have the impression it was Cook's brigade of Heth's division, but cannot, upon the Government map, locate the position, owing to the various lines of breastworks indicated on the map. Major Burrage thinks the location was south of the Old Church road; but there are so many references to Shady Grove and Shady Grove road that others think the position was north of Old Church road, nearer the Shady Grove. If possible I would like to ascertain the distance, also, from Bethesda church, and the bearing by compass. If you can without much trouble assist me in determining this point, you will confer a great favor upon

Yours, very truly,

WM. H. HODGKIN.

Rev. J. Wm. Jones, D. D., Richmond, Va.

EDITORIAL PARAGRAPHS.

NEW SUBSCRIBERS, AND RENEWALS of old ones are still earnestly desired, and we again beg our friends to help us in this direction. Speak to your friends, and secure us also reliable canvassers.

THE SECRETARY IS JUST ABOUT TO MAKE A VISIT to Louisville, Columbus Miss., Montgomery Ala., Mobile, and New Orleans, where he hopes to meet many friends of the Society, and especially to secure some efficient canvassers to help on our good work. We beg that our friends will aid us in this matter.

GENERAL E. P. ALEXANDER, late chief of artillery of the 1st corps, now Vice-President of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad; John A. Grant, General Superintendent Memphis & Charleston Railroad; Colonel A. L. Rives, (the distinguished Confederate engineer,) General Manager of the Mobile & Ohio Railroad; and John F. O'Brien, General Superintendent East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia Railroad, have recently extended to the Secretary warmly appreciated courtesies.

